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Abstract
Electronic commerce has enabled the use of intelligent agent technologies that can evaluate buyers, customize products, and
price in real-time. Our model of an electronic market with customizable products analyzes the pricing, profitability and welfare
implications of agent-based technologies that price dynamically based on product preference information revealed by
consumers. We find that in making the trade-off between better prices and better customization, consumers invariably choose
less-than-ideal products. Furthermore, this trade-off has a higher impact on buyers on the higher end of the market and causes a
transfer of consumer surplus towards buyers with a lower willingness to pay. As buyers adjust their product choices in response
to better demand agent technologies, seller revenues decrease since the gains from better buyer information are dominated by
the lowering of the total value created from the transactions. We study the strategic and welfare implications of these findings,
and discuss managerial and technology development guidelines.
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provide products, services and prices tailored pre-0167-9236/$ - see front matter D 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
doi:10.1016/j.dss.2004.10.007
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: raviaron@wharton.upenn.edu (R. Aron)8
asundara@stern.nyu.edu (A. Sundararajan)8
sviswana@rhsmith.umd.edu (S. Viswanathan).cisely to each consumer’s individual preferences.
This is typically achieved by the deployment and use
of intelligent agents [20]. These software agents can
estimate buyer preferences, valuations and product
tastes by combining consumer purchase histories
with individual and site demographics. Merchants
can then use this information to customize, price and
recommend products to these buyers, simultaneously
increasing the fit of the product to the buyer, and the
amount of surplus they extract from the buyer. The
success of companies like Amazon.com that werexx (2004) xxx–xxxDECSUP-11070; No of Pages 23
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Firefly and NetPerceptions suggests huge potential
gains for that the companies who lead the way in
exploiting more advanced agent technology in
electronic commerce.
In this paper, we study software agents that
determine pricing based on customer preferences
(commonly called dynamic pricing agents, demand
agents or preference-based pricing agents). Although
the technology is still fairly nascent, there are
deployable products available—early software ven-
dors for preference-based pricing agents include
BlueMartini, Manugistics, ProfitLogic, Retek and
Zilliant—and many companies are beginning to
realize their potential. For instance, Ford plans to
move towards pricing its automobile financing
products dynamically, based on customer profiles
and choices, and expects to cut its $10 billion
spending on blanket promotions significantly as a
consequence; Baker et al. [2] also describe an online
electronics components retailer which is using
customer preference data related to demand imme-
diacy to charge differentially on the products it sells;
Ticketmaster has successfully experimented with
differential ticket pricing based on customer specifi-
cations [7]. A number of financial services compa-
nies are using similar technology to price products
and deliver service to their banking and credit card
customers. NextCard uses a self-segmentation system
that prices terms for credit cards based on a product
specification by potential customers; Capital One
uses profiles based on hundreds of variables to tailor
products and prices for specific clients [23]. Other
examples of financial services products using pref-
erence-based pricing and service include those
offered by United California Bank and First Union
Bank [32]. This form of pricing is more closely
related to first-degree price discrimination, in con-
trast with quality or usage-based second-degree price
discrimination, which has been studied extensively in
the theoretical industrial organization literature
[1,22,38].
As the revenue models of online retailing compa-
nies and web portals evolve, they are well positioned
to use agent-based dynamic pricing. Much like
financial services companies, their core product is a
highly customizable information good (an online
shopping experience customized to the buyer, infor-mation customized to the viewer’s browser) with
variability in perceived value, a tangible cost to the
buyer from lack of customization, and low or zero
marginal cost of customization. Currently, leveraging
preference information in these markets has taken on
indirect forms like cross-selling, targeted advertising
and selling segmented marketing information. Each of
these strategies has the same objective—to extract as
much surplus as possible from each consumer, based
on information the consumer reveals to the seller
while customizing a product. These companies may
have to acquire a significant degree of market power
and customer lock-in before they can successfully
gain customer acceptance for direct pricing agent
technologies—the mandate by Jupiter Research that
loyal, quality-seeking customers are the ones who
should be offered personalized dynamic pricing [7]
supports this observation.
However, when a seller actively infers buyer
preferences and valuations, the quality-seeking con-
sumer faces a trade-off-between giving up their
personal information, and getting products or infor-
mation customized better to their tastes. Trade-press
attention has focused primarily on the issue of
personal privacy. According to Weise [37], dlying
when Web sites ask for personal information is a
common tactic to protect privacy. But on such sites, it
destroys the quality of the recommendations you
receive. Answer honestly, and these sites quickly learn
a great deal about what you read, listen to and like to
watch. Whether users will be willing to trade
information about themselves for a more personal
experience online remains to be seenT. These concerns
about privacy have been heightened by the perceived
misuse of information by companies like RealAudio
and DoubleClick.
As preference-based pricing agents become more
widespread, another crucial trade-off for the con-
sumer—and the subject of our paper—is between the
price paid, and the level of customization obtained.
Put simply, the more a demand agent infers about
one’s ideal product, the more it will know about one’s
willingness-to-pay. Intuitively, it appears that this kind
of agent technology is likely to help sellers extract
more value from their buyers. However, it is possible
that consumers may change their behavior and choices
in a manner that counters these potential losses in
consumer surplus. This trade-off is illustrated qual-
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the buyer customizes the product more, as illustrated
by the value curve above the x-axis. However, since
the seller is also able to infer more about the buyer’s
willingness to pay, the price paid by the buyer
increases as well, as illustrated by the (negative) price
curve below the x-axis.
As consumers begin to make these price–product
trade-offs, the profitability and welfare implications of
these inferencing technologies in an electronic market
are not intuitively evident. We address these issues in
this paper, by asking the following questions:
! In an electronic market for customizable informa-
tion goods, how does the presence of intelligent
agents that can infer buyer preferences affect
product pricing and consumer choices?
! What are the relative benefits of intelligent agents
to buyers and sellers, when consumers have
heterogeneous valuations for products, and value
product customization and quality differentially?
! Given these relative benefits to buyers and sellers,
what characteristics of intelligent agents are likely
to benefit sellers and consumers?Fig. 1. The buyer’s fundamental trade-oOur paper enhances the recent stream of work on
price discrimination and differentiation enabled by IT,
and in IT-enabled markets. Recent papers studying
customization and price discrimination include Ulph
and Vulcan [35], who examine a firm’s incentives to
offer mass customization in conjunction with first-
degree price discrimination. They find that a firm
which first-degree price discriminates is also better off
if it mass-customizes. Interestingly, they also conclude
that if mass customization strategies are chosen by
two competing firms, then the profits of each firm are
independent of the price discrimination strategies
chosen by the other firm; this result indicates that
our analysis of a monopolist’s pricing strategies may
generalize well to a competitive environment. Dewan
et al. [14] analyze pricing strategies for firms that sell
both a generic and a differentially customized product,
and find that a firm which mass-customizes must raise
the price of its generic product in order to protect
margins in its custom-product market. In other work
on price discrimination for information goods, Bakos
and Brynjolfsson [3] study the use of bundling
strategies by multiproduct monopolist as a price
discrimination strategy. They find that when consum-ff, when facing a demand agent.
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then offering a menu of different bundles for each
market segment increases the power of traditional
price discrimination strategies. As in our study, their
focus is on information goods with zero marginal
costs; however, we model a market in which
individualized pricing is feasible, making aggregation
a suboptimal strategy.
IT-enabled quality differentiation has been studied
by Nault and Dexter [27], Nault [26], Barua et al. [5]
and Clemons and Kleindorfer [12]. Nault [26]
considers the case where IT facilitates quality
differentiation by enhancing the value of the good/
commodity and enables the seller to charge a price
premium. In contrast, consumers in our model have a
choice of a continuum of qualities (level of custom-
ization), and our model derives optimal levels of
quality for each customer (represented by the degree
of customization chosen). While adoption of tech-
nology is costless to consumers in our model, Nault
(1995) investigates the adoption of IOS, where
consumers incur a fixed cost of adopting the
technology and finds that although adoption of these
technologies (such as IOS and EDI) benefit both the
seller as well as the consumers, the seller may have
to provide subsidies to overcome the barriers created
by the cost of adoption. They also find that in the
case of a duopoly, both firms as well as consumers
are better off with a segmented market with only one
firm adopting the value-enhancing technology.
The unique nature of differentiation in informa-
tion goods is also highlighted by the study by
Bhargava and Choudhury [6] who analyze the
vertical differentiation of information goods. Con-
trary to the case of traditional physical goods
analyzed by Shaked and Sutton [31] and Mussa
and Rosen [25], they find that vertical differentiation
is not an optimal strategy when the highest quality
product has the best benefit-to-cost ratio; the
monopolist is better off offering just the highest
quality. In contrast, Mukhopadhyay et al. [24] study
quality competition among Internet search engines,
finding that zero marginal costs enable the survival
of lower-quality products. Other work in the area of
pricing and differentiation of information goods
includes Varian [36], Jones and Mendelson [18]
and Sundararajan [33], who demonstrates that trans-
action costs can lead to the simultaneous optimalityof both fixed-fee and usage-based pricing. While
adding to this stream of research, our focus is
different—rather than abstracting away the details of
the interaction between the seller, buyer and agent,
we explicitly model the optimal customization choice
of the buyer, and the possible incentives to trade-off
lower customization for better pricing as agent
technology becomes more effective.
In related work on pricing network services based
on user preferences, Konana et al. [19] present a
nonparametric estimation technique that enables the
estimation of consumer demand characteristics from
their observed behavior. Their choice of delay cost
parallels our choice of customization levels by
consumers. Similarly, in the responsive pricing
mechanism in MacKie-Mason et al. [21], price-
sensitive users adjust their traffic inputs based on
the price and how valuable the network service is to
them, an outcome that is consistent with buyer choices
of customization in our model. We contextualize work
done on agent-based technologies [9,28] to a dynamic
pricing setting, and provide a stronger economic
framework for computational work on dynamic
pricing agents [30].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide an overview of our model, and
explain its parameters through a simple example.
Section 3 characterizes buyer and seller actions and
derives expressions for their respective surplus. Some
preliminary implications of these results are also
illustrated. Section 4 presents comparative statics,
using general functional forms as far as possible and
also using a specific set of functional forms to
describe agent inferences. We use these results to
describe the revenue and welfare implications of these
agents, for different types of products, consumers and
agent inference rates. Section 5 discusses the business
implications of these results, and concludes the paper
with a summary of our ongoing research. An extended
mathematical appendix details our proofs, and ana-
lyzes the sensitivity of our results to altering three sets
of key assumptions.2. Model overview
Our market has six basic building blocks—the
sellers, the buyers, the intelligent agent, the seller’s
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knowledge and method of choice, and the sequence of
buyer–seller interaction. We list the elements and
assumptions of each of these below. We then
summarize our notation, and provide an example that
illustrates the different variables in our model.
2.1. Seller
We model a monopolist seller in a market for a
highly customizable information good, with zero
marginal cost and zero cost of customization. The
seller interacts independently with every potential
buyer, and can set a price p independently for each
buyer. The seller can customize the product over a
continuum of customization levels m a [0,1],
independently for each specific buyer.
2.2. Buyers
There are a set of heterogenous buyers for the
customizable product. Each buyer wishes to buy one
unit of the good. Each buyer has a (different) ideal
product, for which he/she has a valuation v. Different
buyers have different valuations v. The ideal product
is the one that is perfectly customized for the buyer,
or has a customization level m=1. If the product has
a customization level mb1, then the buyer’s valu-
ation for the (suboptimally) customized product is
vt(1m)2, where t is referred to as the unit cost of
commoditization. All buyers share a common unit
cost of commoditization t, which is known to the
seller. This is analogous to the concept of a
transportation cost used in spatial models of product
differentiation, and these assumptions, including the
quadratic cost function and common unit trans-
portation cost, are very commonly used in such
models (for instance, Ref. [13], and the literature
following that paper). The buyer is rational in his/her
choice of m, and consequently chooses only those
values of m, such that vt(1m)2z0.
2.3. Intelligent demand agent
The seller uses an intelligent demand agent (IA),
which makes imperfect inferences about the valua-
tions v of these buyers, based on an analysis of the
buyers’ specifications of their desired customization.If the buyer provides the seller with a set of product
specifications that correspond to a customization level
m, and the seller provides this information to the IA,
then the IA provides the seller with an interval
estimate of possible values [e, e+h(m)] of the buyer’s
valuation v for that buyer’s ideal product.1 The
dwindowT [e, e+h(m)] always contains v. This is
illustrated in Fig. 2(a). e can range anywhere from
max[t(1m)2,vh(m)] to v.
The width of the range h(m) is determined by
how accurate the IA is, and by the level of
customization m chosen by the buyer. h(m) is
always strictly decreasing in m, since a higher level
of customization implies a higher level of informa-
tion about the customer’s preferences, and conse-
quently, a better estimate of v. In addition, we
assume that h(m) is convex, reflecting diminishing
returns to this information. This is illustrated in Fig.
2(b). These assumptions are consistent with empiri-
cal results about the returns to information in
intelligent agent learning (for instance, Ref. [28] or
Ref. [16]). The dlevel of curvatureT of the function
h(m) is qualitatively proportional to how rapidly the
agent learns.
We denote h(1)=hmin, and h(0)=hmax as the
narrowest (best) and widest (worst) widths of range
for any buyer, corresponding, respectively, to the
buyer choosing the highest and lowest possible levels
of customization m.
2.4. Seller’s knowledge about the IA
We assume that the seller cannot infer any additional
strategic or distributional information about the buyer’s
valuation from this interval estimate [e, e+h(m)]. This
is motivated by the fact that in reality, software agents
of the kind we model make their inferences based on
product choices, click-stream data and demographic
data, rather than on strategic buyer representations. The
algorithms commonly used by these agents are
typically based on neural networks and fuzzy logic
[15,17]; in addition, more recent descriptions of
demand agents use Q-learning, which draws from
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environment [34]. The agents are effectively dblack
boxesT that provide a seller with outputs after process-
ing a series of inputs, and do not reveal the underlying
functions that resulted in mapping the inputs to the
output. Consequently, sellers can get an estimate of the
buyer’s valuation within a window, but cannot actually
see or explicitly recalibrate the process that led to the
creation of the window. This translates to the following
restrictions in our economic model—that the seller
does not use the information that a buyer with a specific
v would find it optimal to choose a specific level of m,
and that the buyer is aware that the seller does not make
this kind of strategic inference.
Our assumption—modeling intelligent agents as
nonstrategic dinterval choosersT—allows us to focus
on our problem of interest—the changes in consumer
behavior, the corresponding pricing and revenue
implications, and the welfare effects of having agents
that make imperfect inferences. It also implies that the
seller’s prior on v is that it is uniformly distributed2 in2 Since the buyer will not choose a value of h such that vbs(h),
it leads to the question of whether the agent can simply choose e a
[vh, v], and then narrow its interval if ebs(h). We investigate this
modification in part B of our extended appendix, and show that this
modification does not change the optimal buyer choices predicted
by Proposition 1 (and consequently, does not change any of our
subsequent results).[e, e+h(m)]. This choice of distribution corresponds to
a noninformative prior, since the seller has no
distributional information beyond the support of v.
2.5. Buyer choice and knowledge
The buyer is aware that if he/she chooses a
customization level m, the intelligent agent will give
the seller an interval estimate of width h(m). Since
h(m) is assumed strictly monotonic, it is invertible.
Therefore, we can treat the buyer’s choice of m as
being equivalent to the buyer choosing the width of
the IA’s interval h(m). When we say that dthe buyer
chooses an interval width hˆV, what we mean is that
the buyer chooses the customization level m that will
result in an interval width hˆ=h(m).
For subsequent notational convenience, we define
the function s(x)=t[1h1(x)]2. If the buyer chooses
an interval width h(m), the value of the product to the
buyer is vt[1m]2=vs(h(m)), and we refer to s(h)
as the corresponding cost of commoditization (con-
sistent with our definition of unit cost of commodi-
tization in Section 2.2).
The buyer does not know the actual interval
[e, e+h(m)] that the IA will provide the seller. We
assume that the buyer does not make inferences about
the intelligent agent’s behavior from prior interaction.
However, the buyer does know what possible sets of
interval estimates the IA could give the seller.
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Table 1
Sequence of events
Event Buyer
knows
Seller and IA know
Buyer is endowed with v v,s(.) s(.)
Buyer chooses h v,h,s(h) s(.)
Buyer reveals choice of
h to seller
v,h,s(h) h,s(h)
Intelligent agent gives seller
interval estimate [e, e+h]
v,h,s(h) h,s(h),[e, e+h]
Seller chooses and reveals
price p*
v,h,s(h),p* h,s(h),[e, e+h],p*
R. Aron et al. / Decision Support Systems xx (2004) xxx–xxx 7Consistent with our model of the IA, after the buyer
chooses an interval width h(m), the prior that the
buyer has on e is that it is uniformly distributed in [a,
v] where a=max[vh(m), s(h(m))].
This prior on E causes the buyer to form a
corresponding prior on the seller’s price; the price
expected by the buyer3 is denoted p(h). The distribu-
tion of p(h) is derived in Lemma 2. In order to
compute the prior on p(h), the buyer dsolvesT the
seller’s pricing problem for each value of e a [a, v],
and estimates the price that she will face at that level
of customization. The buyer then chooses the h that
maximizes expected consumer surplus w(h), which is:
w hð Þ ¼ E max v p hð Þ  s hð Þ; 0ð Þ½ 
2.6. Sequence of buyer–seller interaction
Each buyer interacts independently with the seller.
The sequence of interaction is as follows:
(1) The buyer is endowed with an ideal-product
valuation v.
(2) A buyer chooses a set of product specifications,
which correspond to a customization level m,
and an interval width h(m).
(3) The buyer specifies these product specifications
to the seller, thereby communicating m, and
consequently h(m) to the seller.
(4) The seller’s intelligent agent generates the
interval estimate [e, e+h(m)], which always
contains the buyer’s true valuation v.3 p(h) is a random variable, not an expected value.(5) The seller sets a price p* for the product.
(6) The buyer purchases the product if he/she gets
nonzero surplus, i.e., if vt(1m)2zp*.
The sequence of information that each party (the
buyer and seller) has at each decision stage is
summarized in Table 1.
2.7. Illustration
To illustrate our model of customization and agent
inference, consider the following example. The
purpose of this example is to explain our model—
the actual dynamics of customization and pricing at
the company mentioned may be different.
eDisc is an Internet music service that allows
individuals to create their own personalized compact
discs. The service features over 250,000 songs from a
wide variety of eras and musical genres. A well-
structured site enables easy navigation, making it easy
for customers to find music that fits their tastes
exactly. A customer can customize a CD with the
exact songs of his/her choice, complete with a unique
title and cover art. eDisc charges different prices
depending on the choices made by each customer. In
addition, the site also offers generic collections of
songs. The firm uses personalization agents to make
inferences about its customers based on individual
profiles and past buyer choices.
Each CD is, therefore, a highly customizable
product. The ideal product (m=1) for each buyer is
a CD containing exactly the songs the buyer wants.
The generic product (m=0) is any CD with one of
the generic collections of songs. In addition, a
buyer could choose an intermediate level of
customization m, by resorting to a combination of
unique choices and standard compilations provided
by the seller. For instance, a buyer wishing to
compile a 70-min CD of sentimental country
favorites, could handpick each song (one from each
of his/her favorite artists) for his/her CD or choose
a combination of a few tracks that he/she is
particularly interested in and an assorted bundle
of country/folk tracks recommended by the seller.
In the latter case, the product is no longer the
buyer’s ideal product and a buyer opting for partial
customization incurs a cost of commoditization. As
mentioned earlier, the only way a buyer can receive
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tracks that would constitute his/her CD.
Based on the choices made by these buyers,
eDisc is able to obtain an interval estimate of their
valuations. Consider a buyer who is choosing a CD
of 10 songs from eDisc’s selection of 1960’s folk
music tracks, and who values his/her ideal product
at $25. This would correspond to v=$25. If this
buyer chooses all the songs that he/she wants
(m=1), eDisc’s intelligent agent is able to infer
her valuation within a margin of $2 (or hmin=2). A
sample interval estimate here would be that the
buyer’s valuation for the buyer’s ideal product is in
[$23.50,$25,50] (which would correspond to
e=$23.50).
On the other hand, if this buyer were to
purchase a precompiled assorted collection of
1960’s folk songs (m=0), the buyer’s valuation is
$15. This means that vt(10)2=$15, or t=$10. In
addition, suppose that in this case, the agent, which
has much less information, can only infer her
valuation within a margin of $5 (which means that
hmax=5). A sample estimate of the buyer’s valuation
v here is that v is in [$23, $28]. Remember that v
is the valuation the buyer has for his/her ideal
product. Consequently, the seller knows that the
buyer will be willing to pay between $13 and $18
for the generic product.
If the buyer hand-picks, say, 5 out of 10 tracks,
and chooses a precompiled set of 5 others (for
simplicity, let’s say that this corresponds to m=5/10),
suppose the intelligent agent can estimate v within a
margin of $3 [which makes h(5/10)=3]. A sample
interval estimate here would be [$23, $26]. The
buyer’s cost of commoditization for this partially
customized product is t(15/10)2=$2.50, which
means that s(3)=$2.50 (h=3 is the width of the
interval dchosenT by the buyer through her choice of
m=5/10).
Consequently, the seller knows that the buyer
would be willing to pay between ($23$2.50) and
($26$2.50), or between $20.50 and $23.50 for this
partially customized product. The buyer’s true valu-
ation for this partially customized product is, of
course, $25$2.50=$22.50.
Note here that m refers to a level of custom-
ization, not a specific product. Two buyers who get
the same level of customization are not buying thesame product—they are merely buying products
which are at the same ddistanceT from their ideal
product. It is precisely this difference in buyers’
ideal products that makes it possible for the
intelligent agent to make inferences about the
buyers’ valuations, based on their product specifica-
tions. For instance, a buyer who chooses a rare
classic from 1913, and another who chooses the
latest single by today’s teen music sensation could
both be getting the same level of customization.
However, their valuations v could be very different.
In addition, a buyer who chooses a combination of
(i) eight of her favorite classical tunes and (ii) an
assorted bundle of rare classicsprovided by the seller,
and another buyer who chooses a combination of (i)
eight of her favorite jazz tunes and (ii) an assortment
of 1980’s jazz tunes, are modeled as choosing the
same level of customization m.
We have chosen this approach to modeling
customization for three reasons. First, while we
have an inherent underlying model of product
differentiation (and a corresponding mapping from
different products to valuation intervals), treating
product choice implicitly as a level-of-customization
variable, instead of explicitly as a vector in a
product space, enables us to capture the aspect of
customization pertinent to our research questions,
without explicitly dealing with a complex product
space. Secondly, the focus of our model is not on
product differentiationUit is on the pricing, con-
sumer choice and welfare implications of inferences
made by an intelligent agent about buyers’ under-
lying valuations, given that buyers who have certain
attribute preferences (and therefore a preference for
particular instances of the differentiated product)
have valuations that are associated with their
product attribute preferences. Finally, using a con-
tinuum of values for customization in one dimen-
sion enables us to use continuous optimization
techniques.3. Analysis: preference revelation and pricing
In this section, we characterize the optimal custom-
ization choice of the buyer, optimal pricing by the
seller, and the corresponding buyer surplus and seller
profit functions.
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The solution to the seller’s pricing problem is
presented in Lemma 1. The mathematical proofs of all
our results are in an extended mathematical appendix,
available online as indicated in the references, or upon
request from the authors.
Lemma 1. If the estimate about the buyer’s valuation
that is provided by the seller (demand) agent is that
the buyer’s true valuation v is uniformly distributed in
[e, e+h], then the optimal price p* for the seller is:
ið Þ pT ¼ e þ h  s hð Þ
2
if eVh þ s hð Þ
iið Þ pT ¼ e  s hð Þ if ezh þ s hð Þ
The intuition behind this pricing scheme is
illustrated in Fig. 3. At a low enough interval
width h from the intelligent agent, the price is setFig. 3. (a) Optimal seller pricing when ebh+s(h).to capture the sale, irrespective of the buyer’s true
valuation—at this level of information accuracy, the
gains from closing the sale with probability 1
outweigh the losses from a lower price. As the
level of error increases, the seller has to trade-off
losing the customer with lower profits from pricing
at a level that will ensure that the sale takes place.
The pricing problem becomes identical to that of a
monopolist facing a set of customers whose
composite demand function is linear and downward
sloping, and the solution—pricing at half the upper
bound on the distribution of valuation—is the
familiar optimal monopoly price.
3.2. Optimal buyer choice
At specific values of e and h, the buyer knows that
the seller sets prices according to the price schedule in
Lemma 1. Given the buyer’s prior on e, the price
distribution the buyer expects for a specific choice of
h is derived in Lemma 2.(b) Optimal seller pricing when eNh+s(h).
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price p set by the seller, at a level of customization
m(h) that induces an error h, has a density function
f(p) which is as follows:
(a) If hV vs hð Þ
2
: p is uniformly distributed in
[vs(h)h, vs(h)], and f(p)=1/h in this
interval.
(b) If
v sðhÞ
2
VhVv sðhÞ : f ðpÞhas support
v sðhÞ
2
; v sðhÞ

; and :
! f ðpÞ ¼ 2
h
for pa

v sðhÞ
2
; h

! f(p)=1/h for pa[h, vs(h)]
(c) If hzvs(h): p is uniformly distributed in
h
;
vþ h  s hð Þ 
; and f pð Þ ¼ 2 in this
2 2 v s hð Þ
interval.
Fig. 4 illustrates the result of this lemma. In case
(a), the buyer’s prior on e is such that e is always in
the range of values for which it is optimal for the
seller to charge the price of Lemma 1 (ii). Hence, the
prior of the buyer on price is simply the prior on e
shifted to the left by s(h). In case (c), the same logic
applies, but for the price of Lemma 1 (i). Since thisFig. 4. (a) For values of hV vs hð Þ
2
, yielding p=es(h). (b) For values hzv
yielding: p=es(h) for eVh+s(h), p ¼ eþhs hð Þ
2
for ezh+s(h).admits a lower range of prices for the same range of e,
the buyer’s prior on price has a narrower support, and
more density on each point of this support. In case (b),
either price from Lemma 1 is possible, depending on
the value of e. Note that h+s(h) is an increasing
function of h so long as s(h) is nondecreasing, and
therefore, these successive intervals correspond to
increasing values of h. This is formally established in
the proof of Lemma 3.
3.3. Buyer surplus
The buyer’s decision problem is to choose the
level of m(h) that maximizes his/her surplus w(h).
At any price p(h), the buyer’s expected surplus
w(h) is the expected value of max[vp(h)s(h),
0], with the expectation taken over the buyer’s
distribution over price p(h). The functional form of
the buyer’s expected surplus is derived in Lemma
3, and the buyer’s optimal choice of product custom-
ization is characterized in Proposition 1.
Lemma 3. If the buyer chooses a level of custom-
ization m(h), with a corresponding interval width h,
then the expected surplus w(h) of the buyer is:
(a) If hV
v s hð Þ
2
; then w hð Þ ¼ w1 hð Þ ¼
h
2
;s(h), yielding p ¼ eþhs hð Þ
2
. (c) For values of
vs hð Þ
2
VhVv s hð Þ,
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v s hð Þ
2
VhVv s hð Þ; then w hð Þ¼w2 hð Þ
¼ v s hð Þ  h
2
 v s hð Þ½ 
2
4h
;
(c) If vs(h)VhV2[vs(h)] then w hð Þ ¼ w3 hð Þ
2Fig. 5. Buyer surplus as a function of h.¼ 2 v s hð Þ½   hð Þ
4 v s hð Þ½ 
, and
(d) If hz2[v-s(h)], then w(h)=0.
Part (a) of Lemma 3 indicates that for high values
of m (or low values of h), decreasing customization
(or increasing h) actually benefits the buyer, since the
buyer’s surplus increases linearly in h. Intuitively, this
is a consequence of the fact that at very high levels of
customization, the seller dknows too muchT about the
buyer’s valuation to make near-perfect customization
worthwhile. This lemma indicates the nature of the
central trade-off of the model—between the benefits
(better customization) and costs (higher price) of
preference revelation.
Proposition 1 examines what the optimal choice of
h will be. This is a crucial proposition of the paper,
since it proves that buyers will almost always choose a
less than ideal product (rather than opting for the ideal
product), or even a generic product. In fact, it shows
that buyers never choose their ideal products.
Proposition 1. The buyer chooses a level of custom-
ization m(h*) which induces an interval width h* such
that:
(a) If hmaxV
v s hmaxð Þ
2
, implying that vz2hmax+
s(hmax), then h*=hmax.
(b)
If hmaxN
v s hmaxð Þ
2
, implying that vV2hmax
+
s(hmax), then h* is the solution to the following
optimization problem:
max
haRþ
w2 hð Þ ¼ v s hð Þ 
h
2
 v s hð Þ½ 
2
4h
;
subject to:
v s hð ÞV2h;
v s hð Þh:
The solution h* is always interior. Furthermore, if
the technology h(m) of the seller’s intelligent agent is
such that s(h) is convex (i.e., if sW(h)z0), then the
unique optimal choice h* of the seller solves wV2(h)=0.The proof of Proposition 1 defines the following
two variables h1 and h2:
h1 solves v s hð Þ ¼ 2h
h2 solves v s hð Þ ¼ h:
The results of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Fig. 5.
At low values of h (i.e., values of h less than h1)
which correspond to high values of customization m,
the price set by the intelligent agent is very close to
the buyer’s true valuation, since the margin of error h
in the agent’s estimate is fairly low. Intuitively, when
the buyer decreases his/her level of customization, she
gets a better price, but also gets a worse product. The
price effect dominates in this region—at high levels of
customization, the gains from a better price strictly
outweigh the losses from a less suitable product. This
causes the buyer to steadily increase the interval width
of the agent. It also confirms that the buyer never
chooses his/her ideal product, however poor the
agent’s inferences are.
For high values of h (i.e., values of h greater
than h2), the buyer’s surplus is strictly decreasing
as the width of the agent’s interval increases, or as
the level of customization decreases. For the seller,
a higher value of h corresponds to a less precise
estimate from the intelligent agent, and a higher
level of uncertainty about the buyer’s true valu-
ation. This favors the buyer, since the seller is more
likely to price lower than the buyer’s true valuation.
However, higher uncertainty also makes the seller
more likely to price too high. The buyer is shut out
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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This reduces the desirability of higher values of
h—coupled with the fact that there are steadily
increasing consumer surplus losses from a less
customized product; this results in surplus strictly
decreasing in this region.
The buyer is therefore pushed towards the middle.
Facing the trade-off between better prices and better
products, Proposition 1 shows that the buyer always
finds herself in the region [h1, h2].
3.4. Seller profits
We now solve for the seller’s expected profit when
selling to a buyer with valuation v.
Proposition 2. If the buyer’s optimal choice is h*, the
seller’s expected profits p(h*|v) from a buyer of
valuation v, are given by:
(a) If vV2hmax+s(hmax), then
p h4jvð Þ ¼ h4
2
þ v s h4ð Þð Þ
2
4h4
:
(b) If vz2hmax+s(hmax), then
p h4jvð Þ ¼ 2vþ h4 2s h4ð Þ
4
:
Apart from the last part of Proposition 1(b),
which requires the convexity of s(h), all of the
preceding results are valid for any specification of
h(.) that is decreasing and convex, and for any
appropriate specification of s(h). Further analysis of
the buyer’s choices are needed to make stronger
statements about the revenue and welfare effects of
these intelligent agents require us to choose con-
crete functional forms for h(.), which we do in
Section 4.4. Results and comparative statics
This section focuses on a specific family
of agent technologies, characterized by the infer-
ence function h(m)=(1m)k, for a range of values
of kz1. These satisfy the properties of h(.)
described in Section 2. They also all yieldthe same range of values of h(hmin=0, hmax=1),
allowing a comparison of buyer choices and seller
profits across different values of k, a measure of the
effectiveness of the technology of the agent, or the
rate at which it infers. In Fig. 2(b), the more
dconvexT curves correspond to higher values of k.
In addition, this family of functions yields s(h)=th2/
k—an analytically appealing form.
We first prove one more set of results that are
independent of the functional form of h(m):
Proposition 3. If the agent technology is such that
s(h) and sV(h) are increasing in the parameter t, and
the buyer’s choice of customization is such that
h*bhmax, then:
(a) At the optimal level of customization m(h*), the
buyer surplus w(h*) is increasing in v and
decreasing in t.
(b) The optimal level of customization m(h*) is
decreasing in v and increasing in t.
(c) The dmarginal rate of substitutionT between v and
t, which is  dw h*ð Þ
dt
=
dw h*ð Þ
dv
, is equal to
ds h*ð Þ
dt
:
These results are discussed shortly. We now focus
on the specific family of agent technologies charac-
terized by the inference function h(m)=(1m)k. In the
figures that follow, we vary k between 1 and 3, using
the closed-form solutions of k=2 from Proposition 4 as
the benchmark midpoint:
Proposition 4. If h(m)=(1m)2, then for a given level
of v and t:
(a) For a buyer with valuation v and unit commodi-
tization cost t, the optimal level of customization
m(h*) chosen by the buyer induces an interval
width h*(v,t) such that:
h4 v; tð Þ ¼ vﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2þ 4t þ t2p :
(b) The resulting consumer surplus is
w4 v; tð Þ ¼ 2þ t 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2þ t 4þ tð Þp v
2
:
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p4 v; tð Þ ¼ v

2þ t 2þ tð Þ t ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2þ t 4þ tð Þp 
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2þ t 4þ tð Þp ;
and are increasing in v, and decreasing in t.
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrate that surplus and
profits are higher with higher valuation customers,
and lower for customers with higher costs of
commoditization. Proposition 3 also establishes that
as the value a buyer places on their ideal product
increases, the final product chosen is further and
further away from that ideal product.
Fig. 6 further illustrates4 the results of Propositions
3 and 4 (for a value of k=2). Fig. 6(a) summarizes the
shape of the surplus function w(v,t) in its two
arguments v and t, confirming that w is increasing in
v and decreasing in t. Since the curves are progres-
sively closer together along the t-axis as v increases,
the figure also indicates that a unit increase in the cost
of commoditization t has a more negative marginal
surplus impact on a higher valuation customer. In other
words, high valuation customers are more adversely
affected by increases in the cost of commoditization;
an observation confirmed by the fact that the cross-
partial of w with respect to v and t is negative.
Proposition 4 shows that the profits of the seller and
the surplus of the buyer move in similar directions,
when v and t change. Fig. 6(b) strengthens these
observations, by indicating that the shape of w and p
are very similar. The seller’s profits are more sensitive
to the cost of commoditization at higher values of
buyer valuation and at higher revenue values. Profits
are jointly (weakly) convex in v and t in the region
plotted, and are a little over twice the buyer surplus.
Fig. 6(c) illustrates how optimal customization
levels chosen by the buyers vary with buyer valuation
and cost of commoditization. This figure illustrates the
trade-off between withholding personal information in
order to get a better price, and revealing this informa-
tion in order to get a better product. Clearly, as v4 The iso-function curves of Figs. 6–8 are a succinct way of
depicting the rate of change and shape of a function of two
variables. Iso-profit curves are commonly used in economic
analysis; our iso-surplus and iso-product curves are loosely
analogous to indifference curves. The curves are plotted by
projecting the iso-(v,t) points (i.e., points on the function’s surface
which have equal values of the function) onto the (v,t) plane.decreases and t increases, the optimal level of custom-
ization increases. This indicates that as the ideal
product valuation v increases, at a constant cost of
commoditization t, the buyer gains more at the margin
fromwithholding information (from a better price) than
he/she loses (due to a less customized product); hence,
the choices of product become increasingly commodi-
tized for higher valuation buyers.
This observation leads us to an interesting con-
clusion—that high valuation buyers seem to incur a
greater loss of surplus than lower valuation buyers,
which is in contrast with standard results from models
of second-degree price discrimination. This effect is
partially a consequence of the fact that t is constant
across buyers. However, Proposition 3(c) indicates
that at a constant level of consumer surplus, the level
of increase in v required to compensate for a unit
increase in t is
ds h
ð Þ
dt
. This departure from standard
results will therefore sustain even when t increases in
v, so long as its rate of increase is less than
ds h
ð Þ
dt
.
We now investigate the effects of varying the
inference rate of the intelligent agent.
Proposition 5. If h(m)=(1m)k, an increase in the
inference rate k of the agent causes a strict reduction
in buyer surplus.
Differentiating the expression for seller profits
from Proposition 2(a), yields the following expression
for the sensitivity of p* to variation in k
dp4
dk
¼  Bh4
Bk
	
v s h4ð Þð Þ2
4 h4ð Þ2 
1
2



	
Bs
Bk
þ Bh4
Bk
sV h4ð Þ


v s h4ð Þ
2h4
for vV2hmax þ t:
ðAÞ
This decomposition(A) has an interesting interpreta-
tion. Using the first-order conditions to the consumer
surplus maximization problem, one can show that
v s h
ð Þð Þ2
4 h
ð Þ2 N
1
2
, and that
v s h
ð Þ
2h
 N0. Note that
Bs
Bk
Bh
þ sV h
ð Þ is simply the total derivative of s(h*)
Bk
with respect to k when h* depends on k, and the
functional form of s also depends on k. This will be
positive when an improvement in technology
(increase in k) causes a net increase in misfit cost
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Fig. 6. (a) Iso-surplus curves for the buyer, as a function of v and t. (b) Iso-surplus curves for the seller, as a function of v and t. (c) Iso-product (constant levels of customization m)
curves for the buyer, as a function of v and t.
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consumer reduces customization in exchange
for a better price. Consequently, the second half of
the expression,   Bs
Bk
þ Bh

Bk
sV h 
ð Þ v s h
ð Þ
2h
 ,
which represents the change in profits from the loss
in customer information, is negative.
However, the term
Bh

Bk
, measuring the change in the
net level of error from the increase in accuracy is likely
to be negative, since it is unlikely that the withholding
of information by the buyer is so drastic that the actual
width of the IA’s window reduces. The first half of the
expression,  Bh


Bk
 v s h
ð Þð Þ2
4 h
ð Þ2 
1
2

; therefore
measures the change in profits from superior agent in-
ference, and is likely to be positive. Consequently, the
seller’s profits could either increase or decrease, de-
pending on the relative magnitude of these expressions.Fig. 7. Low valuation customers (v=0.5). (a) Profits. (b) Level oThe other profit expression derived in Proposition
2(b) is for vz2hmax+t, and as shown in Proposition 1,
the optimal choice of the buyer is constant at
h*=hmax, implying that seller profits are unchanged
by an increase in k.
We investigate the region vV2hmax+t further by
solving the optimization problem of Proposition 1
numerically for values of k varying between 1 and 3,
with our analytical benchmark k=2 as the midpoint.
The lower limit k=1 describes a situation where the
agent’s error is linear in the level of customization
chosen.
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate some of the results of our
analysis. Consistent with Proposition 5, increasing the
rate of inference of the intelligent agent makes the
buyer’s surplus increasingly lower. Surprising, seller
profits consistently displayed the same trend—a
higher rate of agent inference, rather than helpingf customization. (c) Consumer surplus. (d) Total surplus.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 8. High valuation customers (v=2.5). (a) Profits. (b) Level of customization. (c) Consumer surplus. (d) Total surplus.
5 The range of values of t is different for different parts of Figs
7 and 8—since we have normalized the value of m to lie between 0
and 1, fixed ranges of t result in some t values that are significantly
higher or lower than the values of v. We investigate ranges of t tha
are between 20% and 100% of values of v.
R. Aron et al. / Decision Support Systems xx (2004) xxx–xxx16the seller, actually reduces the seller’s profits steadily.
This result holds across a wide range of v and t
values—we have depicted two sample ranges in Figs.
7 and 8. If one examines the level of customization
charts in Figs. 7(b) and 8(b), the total surplus charts of
Figs. 7(d) and 8(d), and relates them back to
expression(A), this result can be explained. As
indicated in Figs. 7(b) and 8(b), since the optimal
level of customization chosen by the buyer drops
dramatically as the agent’s ability to make inferences
improves, so does the total surplus [vs(h*)] that the
buyer and seller split. The revenue results simply
indicate that the buyers adjusts their behavior enough
in such a way that the seller shares in this loss in
surplus. In other words (referring back to Expression
A), for the seller, the gains from superior agent
inference are outweighed by the losses from the
resulting information withholding by the buyer.This observation leads us to a key insight: as the
monopolist’s ability to price discriminate improves, the
high valuation buyer withholds a disproportionately
higher level of information about herself thus resulting
in her choosing a product that is a poorer fit with her
ideal product. Thus, the high valuation buyer does
indeed lose a greater proportion of her surplus than the
low valuation buyer by withholding information.
However, the surplus lost by the high valuation buyer
is not captured by the monopolist, and most of it is
deadweight loss that is reflected in lower total surplus.5.
t
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ization levels as k increases, highlighting the differ-
ential effect these changes have on low and high
valuation buyers. As m decreases and k increases,
higher valuation buyers choose increasingly lower
levels of customization. In addition, Fig. 9 shows that
improving agent technology has a much higher
marginal effect on lower valuation buyers than on
higher valuation buyers. The intuition behind this is
that the effect of improved inference rates has a much
higher net effect on buyers choosing higher values of
m than on those choosing lower values of custom-
ization (the net reduction in m required to maintain the
same value of h is higher at higher values of m), and,
consequently, the low valuation buyers, who choose
higher values of m, are more adversely affected.
A related issue of interest is how the split in total
surplus is affected by changes in the rate of inference.Fig. 9. (a) Slow pace of IA learning (k=1). (b) Moderate pace oFig. 10 illustrates that as buyer valuations increase,
sellers universally attract increasingly larger portions
of the total surplus, across different values of k. This
is illustrated by the fact that as v increases, the seller
percentage revenue curves of Fig. 10(a) move up,
while the buyer percentage surplus curves of Fig.
10(b) move down. As v increases, it does appear that
sellers extract a smaller fraction of the total surplus, as
the inference rates of their agents increase.5. Conclusion
A number of products sold in electronic markets
are consistent with our model of marginal-cost
products which are highly customizable at minimal
cost, whose buyers reveal information about their
valuations through their product choices, and wheref IA learning (k=2). (c) Rapid pace of IA learning (k=3).
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Fig. 10. (a) Seller profits as a percentage of total surplus. (b) Buyer surplus as a percentage of total surplus.
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online retailing services, customizable gateway pages
offered by portals, online financial services products,
travel products, event tickets, credit card and banking
services. As mentioned in Section 1, it is already
common for online merchants of these products to
indirectly extract surplus based on an analysis of user
preferences. For instance, many web portals use self-
reported customer information to place targeted
advertisements, at a premium of 100% to 300%. As
the level of customization increases, and the buyer
reveals more about his/her preferences, the buyer
dpaysT more attention to the advertisements (increas-
ing the premium paid by the advertiser), and will
eventually face the trade-off between higher dpricesT
and better customized content.
Furthermore, as these merchants gain more monop-
oly power and user lock-in, they will evolve towards
direct one-on-one dynamic pricing. Our analysis
offers them the following key managerial insights:
! Intelligent agents cause buyers on the higher end
of the market to move away from customizing
their product choices, despite the fact that they
actually value these ideally customized products
more than lower-end buyers. This result holds for
both fixed and value-proportionate unit costs of
commoditization.
! As these buyers adjust their optimal product
choices in response to better demand agent
technologies, sellers may experience diminishing
profits, since the gains from better buyer valuation
information are countered by the lowering of the
total surplus that the seller eventually extracts a
portion of.Fig. 11. Low cost of commoditization t. (a) IA: Slow pace of learning (kConsequently, sellers may actually benefit from
limiting their use of buyer preference information to
infer willingness-to-pay, so long as they credibly
inform their customers that they are doing so. This
kind of behavior is already widely observed in the
context of consumer privacy. Clearly, on the face of
it, companies could benefit by extracting as much
surplus as possible from their customers’ personal
information. However, a number of them willingly
choose to assure their customers that they will not
use or sell this information, and they make these
statements credible through the endorsement of
organizations like TRUSTe and BBB Online. Rather
than on account of privacy ethics on the sellers’
parts, this choice is often because unless they
promise not to use the information too much, they
will not get the information at all. Our analysis
shows that sellers using intelligent demand agents
will face exactly the same trade-off. One might
therefore anticipate the evolution of a similar
structure, wherein sellers credibly promise not to
extract too much of the informational rents they can
get from their buyers’ preference descriptions. It is
possible that technological watchdog agencies anal-
ogous to TRUSTe may emerge as demand agents
become more popular, and that multiple sellers will
seek the services of a single, well-known intelligent
agent technology, which buyers understand and trust;
this indicates significant market potential for a
company that can establish itself as the trusted agent
intermediary.
The differential impact that intelligent agents have
on high and low valuation buyers has interesting
implications. Figs. 11 and 12 illustrate the nature of
the sources of revenue and surplus in markets driven=1). (b) IA: Rapid pace of learning (k=3). (c) No IA: Fixed price.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 12. High cost of commoditization t. (a) IA: Slow pace of learning (k=1). (b) IA: Rapid pace of learning (k=3). (c) No IA: Fixed price.
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ability of these agents is higher in markets where the
average cost of commoditization is lower. When
customers are more product quality sensitive, using
a pricing agent has a potentially adverse effect on
seller profits. On the other hand, seller profits may
increase vis-a-vis fixed pricing, if buyers in the market
are not very sensitive to customization.
In addition, higher valuation buyers are more
adversely affected by demand agents, and the use of
these agents shifts deadweight loss from the low end
of the market to the high end of the market. When a
seller uses a demand agent, while the magnitude of
total consumer surplus often is reduced, the distribu-
tion of surplus is far more even between buyers of
varying valuation, which is illustrated by a compar-
ison of the agent-driven surplus distributions to those
with a fixed price.6 One strategy for sellers in this
context is to credibly commit to using the intelligent
agent on just lower valuation buyers, and one way of
doing this is by committing to a fixed maximum price.
This way, buyers on the low-end of the market, who
may actually have been shut out with a fixed price,
can enter the market. Simultaneously, buyers with
high valuations can choose their ideal product with
the assurance of a price cap.
We do not explicitly model seller strategies in a
competitive market. Qualitatively, however, one
effect of competition could be to induce agent-based
differentiation among sellers, forcing them to choose
between low and high valuation buyers. Some sellers6 These comparisons are qualitative. A precise comparison
requires us to assume an upper bound on consumer valuations,
which changes the behavior of a demand agent close to this bound.may offer limited customization with no real ceiling
price, and attract a relatively high proportion of low
value sellers. Others may attract high valuation
buyers by offering a combination of superior
customization technology and a credible commitment
to a price ceiling. Since the price ceiling would
determine the threshold valuation above which
buyers must value products to transact with a seller,
this suggest that there could be a continuum of
ceiling prices along which sellers could initially
differentiate themselves (based on the quality of their
agent technology). In contrast, if all sellers were
identical and there really existed no viable basis for
differentiation, as more sellers entered the market,
we would expect to see that the gains from
employing intelligent agents be competed away,
and, in a free-entry model, equilibrium customization
levels being driven by the fixed costs of deploying
agent-based technology.
The presence of an outside good which is an
imperfect substitute for the customizable product
could have varying effects on our results. Since
buyers can customize products until the candidate
product is identical to their ideal product, this
implies that all versions of the product less custom-
ized than the ideal one can be treated as imperfect
substitutes of the ideal product, and in that sense, our
model deals adequately with the presence of imper-
fect substitutes, at least indirectly. The direct
presence of noncustomizable outside goods (such
as preconfigured music CD’s, or integrated research
reports) could have other effects—it may limit the
set of buyers who are interested in customizing, and
consequently, redefine the support of v without
changing the results of the model otherwise. In
contrast, the presence of several sellers that offer
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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extent to which the sellers that wish to sell to high
valuation buyers can price-discriminate.
As mentioned earlier, a third party that certifies
the extent to which various technologies can be
used for price discrimination would allow the buyer
to reveal more preference information, thereby
reducing the deadweight loss from the use of
intelligent agents. However, a combination of
competition and repeat purchases buyers could
achieve the same outcome as a third-party certifying
agency, if there is a mechanism for recording and
reporting reputation. Sellers that commit ex ante to
a self-enforced limit on their extent of price
discrimination and who do not renege on the
commitment would attract higher repeat sales,
especially from high valuation buyers. On the other
hand, sellers that do not make or adhere to such
commitments would lose customers in future peri-
ods (especially the high valuation buyers). A
combination of competition and repeat purchasing
could therefore lead to self-regulated agent use,
although the optimal technology deployment might
well be different from that induced by an interme-
diary.
We also prescribe the use of intelligent pricing
agents only after a seller has acquired a significant
degree of market power, which explains our focus
on a monopolist seller. The value of pricing agents
in an environment of undifferentiated price compe-
tition is minimal, especially if the product sold has
zero marginal cost. However, once consumers are
locked-in due to the brand-specific training, sunk
information, and personal search costs—all signifi-
cant in the context of portals, online retailing and
financial services—the firm essentially acts as the
monopoly described in our model. This is supported
by evidence that customer loyalty is high in
electronic commerce [8,10], and also by results
from work by Ulph and Vulcan [35] analyzing
competitive models in similar, albeit simplified
versions of our setting, where they conclude that
if mass customization strategies are chosen by two
competing firms, then the profits of each firm are
independent of the price discrimination strategies
chosen by the other firm.
While sellers do not necessarily benefit from
better IA technologies, the threat of a rival’sadoption of demand agents might force sellers to
adopt these technologies. Similar results have been
shown in studies on interorganizational systems and
EDI by Barua and Lee [4] and Riggins et al. [29].
As noted by Clemons and Kimbrough [11], some-
times these IT investments become strategic neces-
sities, rather than yielding competitive advantage.
This represents an interesting direction for future
research. Another interesting extension may be
studying the effects of sequential learning by the
demand agent. The technological implications are
likely to be better inference over time, or in the
language of our paper, a narrower window around
the buyer’s true valuation with each successive
interaction. Our model already has the elements to
capture the effects of this improvement—via a
rescaling of the inference function, by an increase
in the rate of learning, or by a combination of the
two. This enables us to hypothesize on the overall
effects of learning, based on our current results—if
the buyer is aware that with each interaction, the
agent’s accuracy increases at some exogenously
specified rate, learning is likely to strengthen one
of the basic results of our paper—that demand
agents can impact seller profits adversely, and that
this effect is more pronounced for higher valuation
buyers. A buyer will withhold more preference
information in early periods, and will also progres-
sively choose lower levels of customization as the
agent’s performance improves. It is likely that this
will result in lower total surplus, but a higher
percentage of the split going to the seller. The
complexity of a model of this sort makes its
analysis beyond the scope of this paper; however,
it is an extension we may consider for future
research.
This paper is the first systematic analysis of the
economic implications of intelligent agent technol-
ogies that infer buyer valuations in a market for
customized information products. Our results are
consistent with contemporary business trends, and
prescribe business strategies for the many companies
who will be faced with the decision of whether to
use this technology, and if so, how to design and
target it effectively. We hope that our paper will
serve as the foundation for research that further
enhances our understanding of the future of agent-
driven commerce.
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m Level of customization chosen by the buyer.
ma[0,1]. m=0 implies a choice of a generic
product, and m=1 implies a choice of the
buyer’s ideal product.
t Unit cost of commoditization. A choice of a
level of customization m results in a cost of
commoditization t(1m)2, and a net value of
vt(1m)2 to the buyer.
h(m) Width of the interval estimate of a buyer’s
valuation by the intelligent agent, when the
buyer’s level of customization is m.
hV(m)b0, hW(m)z0.
hmax=h(0) Width of the interval estimate at the lowest
level of commoditization.
hmin=h(1) Width of the interval estimate, when the
buyer chooses his/her ideal product.
e Lower support of the interval estimate.
s(h) Cost of commoditization borne by the
buyer choosing a level of customization
m corresponding to an interval width h.
s(h)=t(1m(h))2.
a Lower support of the buyer’s prior on e.
a=max[s(h),vh].
p(h) Price expected by the buyer choosing a
level of customization corresponding to an
interval width h. p(h) is a random variable,
not an average value.
f( p) Density of p(h).
p* Optimal price chosen by seller.
w(h) The net consumer surplus expected by the
buyer when choosing a customization level
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